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INTRODUCTION
WHETHER a person is under a duty to make any effort to control the
conduct of another to avoid harm to a third person presents a prob-
lem in the law of Torts which is generally treated as one of affirmative
obligation. The distinction between misfeasance and mere non-feasance
is an old one and, while the line is recognized as shadowy in places,
it still affords a practical basis for analysis. Whether given conduct
is to be described as the improper performance of proper acts or
a failure to perform acts which should have been performed is the
orthodox touchstone for deciding many tort cases.' To be sure, this
formula is capable of manipulation, and any given set of facts can be
compressed to come within the concept of non-feasance or expanded to
fit the mould of misfeasance. The trick is a simple one of selecting
that point in the series of happenings from which the analysis is
to start.' An accident at a level crossing, for example, may logically
be regarded as the result of the mere failure of the engineer to sound
a warning or make timely application of his brakes; or it can be re-
garded as the improper operation of the locomotive. But although the
formula is thus superficial and inexact, the basic principles for determin-
ing duty are the same in all cases. A sounder basis for analysis
is the relationship of the parties. If the conduct of the actor has
brought him into a human relationship with another, of such character
that sound social policy requires either some affirmative action or some
precaution on his part to avoid harm, the duty to act or take the precau-
tion is imposed by law. "Given a relation," says Judge Cardozo with
characteristic insight,3
"involving in its existence a duty of care . .. , a tort may result as well
from acts of omission as of commission in the fulfillment of the duty thus
recognized by law. What we need to know is not so much the conduct to
be avoided when the relation and its attendant duty are established as exist-
tProfessor of Law, Indiana University School of Law; author of A TREAmTSE O N T
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ttjudge of the Appellate Court of Indiana.
1. See BoHLEx, STUDIES IN TEE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 33.
2. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) 204, § 81.
3. Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 167, 159 N. E. 896, 898
(1928).
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ing. What we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation. It
is here that the formula, however incomplete, has its value and significance."
Judge Cardozo has thus deftly pointed out the actual basis of policy
for the distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance. The man
who has undertaken a definite course of continuous action thus brings
himself into relation with other human beings within the zone of possible
danger, to an extent requiring that precaution against bodily harm
to such persons which a reasonable man under the circumstances would
take. If he fails to do so, this is characterized as misfeasance. In
other words, an actor is always under the duty to see that other
persons are not immediately exposed to an unreasonable risk from
his acts. On the other hand, a previous course of action, not in itself
creating risks to others, may have brought the actor into certain social-
ly recognized relations with others which are of such a character as to re-
quire affirmative acts to protect them from risks which the person thus
required to act had no part in creating. The failure to perform such
an act is described as non-feasance. The situation is more easily com-
prehended by treating the latter situation as the only one depend-
ing upon the relationship of the parties. The principle is thus ordin-
arily formulated that while an actor is always bound to prevent his
acts from creating an unreasonable risk to others, he is under the af-
firmative duty to act to prevent another from sustaining harm only
when certain socially recognized relations exist which constitute the
basis for the legal duty.
Accordingly, it may be said that there is ordinarily no general
duty to act for the protection of others. As formulated in the Re-
statement of Torts,4 "The actor's realization that action on his part
is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon hih a duty to take such action." This principle would be applic-
able to the specific problem of the duty to control another's conduct to
prevent harm to a third person. Certain situations there are, however, in
which the social relationships of the parties are of such a charac-
ter that the law imposes the affirmative duty upon one person to at-
tempt to control another's conduct to avoid an unreasonable risk to
a third person. There are two kinds of relationships which give rise
to this duty. The relationship between the defendant and the per-
son who threatens the harm to the third person may be such as to
require the defendant to attempt to control the other's conduct. On
the other hand, there may be a relationship between the defendant
and the person exposed to harm which requires the defendant to af-
4. TORTS REsTATEaNT, Draft T. No. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 192.
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ford protection from certain dangers including the conduct of oth-
ers. It is the purpose of this article to consider a few situations in
which this duty is present.
CHARACTER OF THE DUTY
The cases which constitute the basis of this investigation disclose that
the problem is primarily one .of negligence. There is no duty to con-
trol another's conduct at the risk of the actor. The problem is not
one of action or failure to act at peril. There is no obligation corre-
sponding to the absolute duty imposed by common law so to control
the activities of wild animals as to prevent, at all events, the animal
from causing harm to another.5 The law might have been otherwise
and drawn such an analogy; for obvious reasons, however, it has
not done so. There are, for example, sufficient considerations for a less
onerous duty on the part of a parent to control the conduct of his
minor child, even though a vicious one, than for one who harbors a
vicious animal to control the activities of the beast. A man is not
required to harbor a wild animal and, if he chooses to do so, cannot
complain that the common law imposes upon him the risk that the
animal will exhibit its wild character and attack another. He may ex-
ercise all the care of which he is capable, but nevertheless be held
for the unfortunate consequences of his conduct. Parents, on the other
hand, are not able to exercise the same volition with respect to the
rearing of a family, and while children may have many of the vicious
propensities of animals, sufficient reliance is placed upon the veneer of
civilization to reduce the recognizable risks to a point much lower than
those involved in the harboring of animals.
Thus, the duty involved in controlling the conduct of human be-
ings is at most the duty to exercise reasonable care for the preven-
tion of harm to others. The risk against which the attempt to exercise
control must be directed may be either action on the part of the other
intended to harm a third person, or action on his part which con-
stitutes negligence toward the third person. A parent, therefore, as
will be seen, may be under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to
control the conduct of his minor children as to prevent his child from
intentionally attacking another or from so acting that its conduct con-
stitutes a recognized and unreasonable risk of harm to the third person.
Another's Use of Defendant's Chattel in his Presence
The fact that another is using a defendant's chattel in the latter's pres-
S. May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101 (1846); Hays v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621, 43 So. 81S (1907);
Copley v. Wills, 152 S. W. 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Opelt v. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. App.
776, 183 Pac. 241 (1919).
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ence has, at least under certain circumstances, been regarded as a
sufficient basis for an affirmative duty on the part of the defendant to
control the conduct of the other in such a way as to prevent him from
unduly endangering third persons. A number of cases involving the driv-
ing and operation of vehicles have seemingly involved this doctrine.6
One of the earliest cases involved the liability of the possessor of a
horse and carriage who permitted a guest to drive the horses.7 Through
the negligent driving of the guest while the possessor was in the car-
riage, an injury was caused to a third person. The possessor was held
liable, not for the negligence of the driver, but apparently for his own
fault in failing to exercise that care which was proper on his part to
prevent the driver from being negligent. "He is the party in possession,"
said the court, "he is present, he has the actual control."" A Pennsyl-
vania caseo involving a similar vehicle arrived at the same result, al-
though the basis therefor was clearly that of master and servant. There
the owner had permitted his guest to take the reins while he sat in the
carriage with him. The court reasoned that since the owner had the
choice of the person who should drive and, as owner, had the right to
control his actions while driving and the right to retake the reins at any
moment, he was liable for the driver's negligence as his master. ° A
later English case, Sampson v. Aitchison," involved the application
of the same reasoning to the driving of an automobile. Here a pros-
pective purchaser desired her son's advice before buying the vehicle.
The defendant's agent, a salesman in charge, took the prospective cus-
tomer and her son for a demonstration and during the demonstration
permitted the son to drive the car. The inexperienced son injured
a traveler who brought an action against the defendant as owner of
the vehicle. The court held the defendant liable on the ground that,
being in possession of the automobile and thus in a position to direct
and control its operation, it was chargeable with the negligence of the
driver.
It is to be observed that in very few of these cases is the principle
enunciated with that clarity which would indicate the difference between
vicarious liability and liability for the defendant's own default. In
6. Sampson v. Aitchison, [1912] A. C. 844; Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204, 104 AtI. 587
(1918); Kelly v. Thibodeau, 120 Me. 402, 115 AtI. 162 (1921); Pratt v. Patrick, [1924)
1 K. B. 488; Beaudoin v. Mahaney, 131 Me. 118, 159 Atl. 567 (1932); Wheeler v. Dar-
mochwat, 280 Mass. 553, 183 N. E. 55 (1932).
7. Wheatley v. Patrick, 2 M. & W. 650 (Eng. 1837).
8. Id. at 652.
9. McMahen v. White, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 169 (1906).
10. Id. at 173.
11. Supra note 6.
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many of the cases the court is obviously attempting to rationalize the re-
sult as the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 2 In
others the courts do not predicate liability upon that ground, but upon
the ground that. the possessor, having, as such, an ability to control
the driver, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to do so. Thus
in a Massachusetts case,1" the court said,
"When it appears that an owner of an automobile is riding in it while it is
being driven by another in an improper manner, and there is no evidence in-
dicating a contractual surrender, nor evidence of an abandonment, of the own-
er's right to control it, the inference is warranted that the owner knew of and
permitted its improper operation and thus became responsible for the conse-
quences.'
14
The fact that in such cases the operator of the car is negligent has
misled many courts to regard the liability of the owner and possessor
as based upon the driver's negligence when it should, in most instances,
be based both on the driver's negligence and the negligence of the pos-
sessor in failing to exercise care to prevent that negligent operation. It
is to be observed that if the owner or possessor were liable for the negli-
gence of the driver, it would be immaterial whether or not he "knew
of" or "permitted" the improper operation of the vehicle.
The ordinary grounds of respondeat superior are seldom if ever
available adequately to explain the possessor's liability in these cases.
While the case of Sampson v. Aitchison might have been explained as a
case of joint enterprise upon the theory that the driver and owner
were mutually interested in the demonstration of the car," the em-
phasis in the opinion was placed upon the fact of possession by the
defendant and the accompanying control over the driver. The form-
ula of "control" is emphasized by nearly all the courts.
"Collins, when he took the wheel came under the control of the defendant...
12. See McMahen v. White, supra note 9, at 173; Beaudoin v. Mahaney, supra note 6;
Doyon v. Massoline Motor Car Co., 98 N. J. L. 540, 120 Atl. 204 (1923). Of course, it is
clear that some of the cases extend liability so that it is actually vicarious. Thus, in
Doyon v. Massoline Motor Car Co., supra, and in Beaudoin v. Mahaney, supra, the
holding seemed to be that the owner of the car whose agent was demonstrating it, was
liable for the negligence of the prospective purchaser. who was driving it. These cases can
all probably be explained as cases of joint enterprise. The same may be said for Sampson
v. Aitchison, supra note 6. See Slater, J., in Brooke v. Bool, [1928] 2 K. B. 578, 585.
13. Wheeler v. Darmochwat, supra note 6.
14. Id. at 557, 183 N. E. at 57.
15. See Robison v. Oregon-Washington Rr. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594 (1918);
Fisher v. Johnson, 238 Ill. App. 25 (1925). See Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 676.
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If Collins had been going too quickly, and Sampson had told him to go slow,
and Collins persisted in going too quickly, Sampson would have had the right
to say to him: 'If you wish to continue to drive my car you must drive it as
I direct, and if you will not do so you must cease to drive it.' In such circum-
stances Collins would have had to obey orders or cease driving."'16
The "control" aspect of these cases is to be sharply distinguished from
"control" as it is employed in the cases involving master and servant
or joint enterprise. Control as the basis for the master's liability for
the servant's negligence is obviously a fictitious control; the master
is liable whether or not he in fact had any control over his servant.'7 So
too, in the case of a joint enterprise, the "joint control" of the parties
seems primarily a convenient device whereby the extraordinarily dif-
ficult question whether one person should be held vicariously responsible
for the negligence of the other can be passed by the judge to the jury.'"
In the present problem, however, the word "control" is apparently hon-
estly employed to indicate the fact that a driver of a vehicle will or-
dinarily comply with the wishes and directions of the owner of the
car. "Control" is, therefore, used in a very real sense.
The rationale of this situation is indicated by the interesting com-
parison between the duty of the possessor of the vehicle to control the
driving of a guest and the apparent lack of duty of a guest to control
the driving of the owner so as to protect third persons. No case has
been found in which a guest in a carriage or an automobile has been
held liable to a third person injured by the owner's negligent driving
for failing to control the driver. This is perfectly consistent with com-
mon sense. If A is the gratuitous guest of B in the latter's car, A natur-
ally feels reticent about offering suggestions and criticisms of B's driving.
Such back-seat operation of a motor vehicle is not only commonly re-
garded as discourteous but is invariably resented by the owner of the
car. On the other hand, if B, the owner, permits a guest to drive the
car, B does not feel the same reticence about warning of excessive speed
or other dangerous operation, nor does the guest resent such suggestions.
It is commonly felt that the fact of possession and ownership carries with
it the privilege of direction and control of the manner in which the ve-
hicle is operated. It is to be noticed, however, that a great mass of
authority establishes the rule that even a gratuitous guest must protest
against the driving of the owner if the guest is himself endangered there-
16. Sampson v. Aitchison, supra note 6, at 850.
17. As where the servant commits a tort while engaged in an act prohibited by the
master.
13. See HARPER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 148.
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by.19 In other words, while the guest is under no duty to attempt
to control the driving for the protection of third persons, he is under a
very definite duty to attempt to control the driving for his own protec-
tion.20  But again the explanation is obvious. Even a gratuitous guest
is felt justified in protesting against acts of the owner in driving the car
if the guest is himself exposed to an unreasonable risk. This is a mere
matter of self-defense against negligence. The situation is comparable
to the rules governing self defense against another's conduct intended to
injure the actor; the latter is always privileged to use reasonable force
to protect himself from an attack. But the common law has not ex-
tended this privilege for the protection of third persons unless the per-
son threatened is a member of the actor's family or is in some other
way under his piotection. 12 If the actor intervenes to protect another
not under his protection, he takes the risk that the other is privileged
to defend himself."s In other words, the actor under such circumstances
has no privilege of his own but can avail himself only of such privilege
as the person to whose aid he goes may have. It would seem clear
that if there is no privilege to protect third persons from an assault, a
fortiori there is no duty to protect them from mere negligent conduct.
Thus it is that, just as there is no general privilege to assist third per-
sons when threatened with the intentional infliction of bodily harm by
another, there is no general duty to control another's negligent driving
to protect third persons thereby exposed to harm, although there is such
a duty to protect oneself.
It may be questioned whether this rule is peculiar to the operation of
vehicles or whether it is safe to make generalizations. To be sure, the
operation of an automobile is a particularly dangerous activity and this
fact is, of course, of importance. It is suggested, however, that its
importance lies only in the application of the standard of reasonableness,
and not in the question of whether the possessor is under the duty to act
as a reasonable man in an attempt to control the other's conduct. It
is to be remembered that the courts have generally refused to place the
automobile in a different legal category from other chattels solely be-
19. Crescent v. Anderson, 114 Pa. 643, 8 At. 379 (1886); Bush v. Union Pacific Rr.
Co., 62 Kan. 709, 64 Pac. 624 (1901); Cahill v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 92 Ky. 345, 18
S. W. 2 (1891).
20. See cases collected in Note (1922) 18 A. L. R. 309, and Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 293.
21. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 115 S. C. 483, 101 S. E. 648 (1919); Gossett v. State,
123 Ga. 431, 51 S. E. 394 (1905); Sloan v. Pierce, 74 Kan. 65, 85 Pac. 812 (1906);
Tompkins v. Knut, 94 Fed. 956 (C. C. D. Ky. 1899); Frew v. Teagarden, 111 Kan. 107,
205 Pac. 1023 (1922) ; Barfoot v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 953 (Eng. 1733).
22. Utterback v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 723, 49 S. W. 479 (1899); Obier v. Neal,
1 Houst. 449 (Del. 1857); Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, 45 So. 641 (1908). But see
"Warnack v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 60 S. E. 288 (1908).
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cause its use is more likely to cause accidents. 3 It is quite obvious that
a reasonable man will foresee danger from the operation of an automobile
when there would be no recognizable risk from the use of other chattels
and it is submitted that the principle involved in the cases under dis-
cussion is one which should receive general application.
Relationship of Parent and Child
The relationship of parent and minor child affords a sufficient basis
for the affirmative duty on the part of the parent to exercise his par-
ental control to prevent the child from intentionally or negligently harm-
ing others. Here again, the relationship does not make the parent liable
as such.24 He is, however, liable for his own torts, and this liability may
arise out of the failure to perform definite acts to control the child
when, as a reasonable parent, he should recognize that such control is
necessary to prevent the child's injuring third persons. Again, these
cases are to be distinguished from those in which the child is in fact
the servant of the parent; in them the doctrine of respondeat superior is
sufficient to impose liability upon the parent." A distinction is like-
wise to be drawn between the situation in question and that where the
parent furnishes or turns over to his child a chattel which, in view of
the child's immaturity, is likely to be so used that it will cause harm to
others. In such a case, the relationship of parent and child is unimport-
ant; liability would be imposed were it absent. Thus, a parent who fur-
nishes his minor child with an automobile which he is incapable of
driving with reasonable care is liable if the child negligently injures a
third person;2 but he is also liable if he furnishes an automobile to an
23. See, e. g., the reluctance of courts to rest the results of the "family automobile doc-
trine" cases on the ground that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality. Compare
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), with Herr v. Butler,
101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931), and Engleman v. Traeger, 102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527
(1931), as to which see Note (1932) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 60. And see Parker v. Wilson,
179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912); Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 130 N. W. 336 (1911).
Compare also the refusal of the New York Court of Appeals to base the liability of the
manufacturer of an automobile to the ultimate user for negligence in its construction upon
the ground that the automobile is inherently dangerous. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
24. Zeeb v. Bahnmaier, 103 Kan. 599, 176 Pac. 326 (1918) ; White v. Seitz, 342 Ill. 266,
174 N. E. 371 (1930); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929); Hulsey v.
Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S. E. 664 (1931); Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225,
50 N. W. 135 (1891).
25. Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476 (1882); Hower v. Ulrich, 156 Pa. 410, 27
Atl. 37 (1893); Trahan v. Smith, 239 S. W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
26. Hopkins v. Droppers, 184 Wis. 400, 198 N. W. 738 (1924); and see Note (1925)
36 A. L. R. 1164.
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adult stranger under similar circumstances.27  This liability of the par-
ent arises from his active misconduct; he has actually created an un-
reasonable risk to others by placing a chattel in the hands of a person
whose use thereof is likely to create a recognizable risk to third persons.
There is ample authority to sustain the imposition of such an affirm-
ative duty.2" Thus, where a parent had knowledge of the habit of his
minor child of beating other children with sticks, he was held liable be-
cause he had failed to exercise that control which a reasonable parent
should have exercised to correct the child's vicious instincts. 9 The parent
had not furnished the child with the club with which he beat the plaintiff,
the child was not performing any service for the father at the time, nor
did the father actively participate in the child's misconduct. Liability
was imposed because the father had failed to exercise care to correct
the child's dangerous propensities. So too, in a recent case, a parent
was held liable for an assault made by his child when it appeared that
the parent had knowledge of the child's habit of bullying smaller chil-
dren and had not taken reasonable steps to correct the evil.30 Said the
court,
"While it is true that parents are not liable for torts committed by their minor
children without their consent and knowledge, yet the principle applicable to
the facts alleged in this case is that the parents are liable if it appears that
they knew that their child was guilty of committing the particular kind of
tort habitually . . .and made no effort to correct or restrain him."
31
In a Wisconsin case,12 it was held that a father who had knowledge that
his minor children were in the habit of scaring horses passing along the
highway, was bound to use reasonable care so to control them as to pre-
vent the plaintiff's horses from being frightened. Again, in an Ontario
case,33 a parent was held responsible to a plaintiff whose straw had been
burned by the defendant's imbecile child when it appeared that the par-
ent had knowledge of the child's propensity to play with matches and
27. Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922).
28. Charlton v. Jackson, 183 Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670 (1914); Hoverson v. Noker,
60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382 (1884); Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L. R. 214 (1911); Stewart
v. Schwartz, 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N. E. 719 (1914); Daggy v. Miller, 180 Iowa 1146,
162 N. W. 854 (1917); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929); Ryley v.
Lafferty, 45 F. (2d) 641 (D. Idaho 1930); and see Bollinger v. Rader, 153 N. C. 433, 69
S. E. 497 (1910).
29. Norton v. Payne, supra note 28.
30. Ryley v. Lafferty, supra note 28.
31. Id. at 642.
32. Hoverson v. Noker, supra note 28.
33. Thibodeau v. Cheff, supra note 28.
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had failed to exercise the care required of him to prevent the child from
playing near the straw. And in an Indiana case,3" a parent was held
liable for failing to prevent his children from stretching a rope across a
highway whereby the plaintiff, while bicycling, ran against the rope and
was thrown to the ground.
In a number of these cases, it seems apparent that the courts are
struggling to find the appropriate basis for liability. In many of them,
the parent is connected with the tort of tlie child by his knowledge of
the latter's propensities. This knowledge is referred to as an "acqui-
escence" or "consent" to the actual tort,35 although it is admitted that at
the time thereof, the parent did not in fact know that the wrongful act
was being committed. The fictitious character of this reasoning is ob-
vious. It is an attempt to hold the parent by forcing the case within
either the well-known rule that an actor who in any way participates
in the commission of a wrong is a party to it, or that the "consent"
to the wrongful acts, thus fictitiously inferred, constitutes an authoriza-
tion to the child to act on behalf of the parent. However, consideration
of the facts in these cases, together with the unanimity of results, argues
strongly that the parent is held because he has failed to exercise the care
which a reasonable parent should exercise to prevent his child from
creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons.
In none of the cases is it suggested that a parent may be liable for his
failure so to rear and train his child as to make it amenable to discipline.
Parents might properly be horrified at the thought of being held legally
responsible for the efficacy of their disciplinary measures. The issue of
negligence, therefore, must be focused upon a particular failure of the
parent to adopt reasonable measures to prevent a definite type of harm-
ful conduct on the part of the child. General responsibility for the rear-
ing of incorrigible children is not involved.
Other Cases Where Defendant has Special Ability to Exercise Control
Over Another
There are other situations where there is involved the principle that
a special relationship between two persons which gives the one a definite
control over the actions of the other carries with it the duty to exercise
that control in such a way as to protect third persons. A unique Eng-
lish case illustrates the principle in an extraordinary situation36  The
defendant was authorized by the plaintiff to go into the latter's shop
at night when the plaintiff was absent to see that the place was secure.
34. Stewart v. Schwartz, supra note 28.
35. See Thibodeau v. Cheff; Norton v. Payne, both supra note 28.
36. Brooke v. Bool, supra note 12.
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On one occasion, the defendant took with him a friend who, detecting
the odor of escaping gas, struck a match in an attempt to discover its
source. An explosion resulted, damaging the plaintiff's goods. The de-
fendant was held liable on the theory that his friend was present on
the premises solely in the right of the defendant who thus had the pe-
culiar ability to control his friend's conduct. His failure to exercise
reasonable care so to do was a breach of a duty toward the plaintiff.
"The tefendant was in control of the enterprise," said the court. "It
was only by his permission and at his invitation that Morris was in the
shop, and he had a right to require Morris to leave the shop at any mo-
ment."
'37
The relationship of master and servant, it seems, affords the master
in some instances a peculiar ability to control the conduct of the servant
even beyond the ambit of activity commonly designated as the scope
of the employment. Some acts are so clearly disconnected with the
purpose of the employment and so exclusively done by the servant on his
own account that they are clearly not of a character such as to make
the master liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Neverthe-
less, these acts may be so connected with the employment in time and
place as to give the master a special opportunity to control the ser-
vant's conduct. In an interesting case decided- by the United States
Supreme Court," a defendant railroad company was held liable when
a piece of timber thrown by a member of the crew of a passing train
struck the plaintiff and caused serious injury. It appeared that the
train crews frequently engaged in such conduct to the knowledge of the
company and that, although they so acted entirely outside the scope
of their employment, the company owed the duty to individuals to cor-
rect such dangerous conduct.
"It is not a question of scope of employment or that the at of the individual
is performed by one who has ceased for the time being to be in the employ-
ment of the company. The question is, does the company owe any duty what-
ever to the general public, or, in other words, those individuals who may be
in the streets through which its railroad tracks are laid, to use reasonable dil-
igence to see to it that those who are on its trains shall not be guilty of any act
which might reasonably be called dangerous and liable to result in injuries to
persons on the street, where such act could by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence on the part of the company have been prevented." 39
The Court held that such a duty did exist. The New York Court of Ap-
37. Id. at 584.
38. Fletcher v. Baltimore & Potomac Rr. Co., 168 U. S. 135 (1897).
39. Id. at 140.
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peals arrived at a similar result when it imposed liability upon the own-
er of a factory for failing to prevent his workmen from throwing articles
out of the window at persons on the street below.40
Those who have special professional knowledge or skill may be so as-
sociated in the practice of their profession as to require that one exercise
appropriate care to control the conduct of the other so as to avoid an
unreasonable risk to third persons. And this is true although neither is
the servant of the other and although neither is vicariously responsible
for the negligence of the other under the "joint enterprise" formula. In
a recent Idaho case,4 an action was brought against a surgeon for burns
sustained by the patient when a hot water bottle was negligently left in
her bed while she was still under an anesthetic. The evidence disclosed
that the defendant had not himself handled the hot water bottle nor
prepared the patient's bed; apparently the mistake had been that of. a
special nurse, not the defendant's servant. He was held liable, however,
because, being in control of the entire proceedings and in charge of the
patient, it was his duty to exercise reasonable care to see that the patient
was not exposed to risk of harm by the conduct of any of the persons
attending her, whether independent contractors or not. The principle
was recognized by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals42 in a
case in which the defendant was in charge of the plaintiff during her
confinement but another physician was called in for the delivery. After
consultation it was agreed that the use of instruments was necessary
and the other physician used the forceps, presumably without sterilizing
them. The plaintiff was severely lacerated as a result of the operation
and contracted blood poisoning. In stating the principles which deter-
mined the defendant's liability, the court explained:
"Two physicians, independently engaged by the patient and serving to-
gether by mutual consent, necessarily have the right, in the absence of instruc-
tions to the contrary, to make such a division of service as, in their honest judg-
ment, the circumstances may require. Each must not only bring to the case
the ordinary knowledge and skill of the profession, but also give his best per-
sonal attention and care . . .Each, in serving with the other, is rightly held
answerable for his own conduct, and as well for all the wrongful acts or omis-
sions of the other which he observes and lets go on without objection, or which,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence under the circumstances, he should have
observed."
42
An obvious application of the principle under discussion would appear
to be situations in which the defendant has control over another who
40. Hogle v. Franklin Manufacturing Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (1910).
41. Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P. (2d) 318 (1931).
42. Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
43. Id. at 762.
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is by reason of some social or mental maladjustment a dangerous per-
son. Thus, those in charge of penitentiaries or insane asylums would
seem clearly to come within this rule. It was so held in a Maine case 4
in which the State was held liable in an action of tort when the superin-
tendent of an insane hospital negligently liberated a patient who was
dangerous to the community and who subsequently destroyed the plain-
tiff's property by fire. On the other hand, the problem is frequently
confused by inappropriate discussion of proximate causation. Thus, the
Louisiana court refused to impose liability upon the superintendent of
an insane asylum for his negligent release of a patient afflicted with an
incurable homicidal mania who subsequently killed the plaintiff's hus-
band 5 The court thought that the defendant's negligence was not
the proximate cause of the death. The fallacy here is obvious. There
is ample support for the proposition that the negligent or criminal inter-
vening act of another will not cut off the necessary causal relation be-
tween a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's harm if the intervening
criminal act was foreseeable by the defendant.l Here the very risk
which constitutes the defendant's negligence is the probability of such
action. It is clear that when such action occurs, it should not insulate
the defendant's negligence under the causation formula. In other words,
it is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because
the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his conduct
negligent, has brought about the expected harm.
RELATIONSHIP OF DEFENDANT TO PERSON INJURED
Persons Under Special Protection of Defendant
Where a person is under the special protection of another, the latter
is bound to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to him, and this
duty may include protection from the dangerous conduct of third per-
sons. The relationship of parent and child is the obvious example of this
situation. The problem here, however, is rendered largely academic be-
cause of the general incapacity of a child to recover from its parent for
a tort against its person." If, however, the child is under the protection
44. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 119 Atl. 577 (1923). And see Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Ry. Co. v. Wood, 95 Tex. 223, 66 S. W. 449 (1902).
45. Cappel v. Pierson, 15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391 (1931), as to which see (1931)
45 HAnv. L. Rav. 192.
46. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mills, 3 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925);
Bower v. New York Central Rr. Co., 91 N. J. L. 190, 103 Atl. 166 (1918); Fordon v.
Bedand, 265 Mass. 40, 164 N. E. 734 (1929); Beatty v. Dunn, 103 Vt. 340, 154 Atl. 770
(1931); Marshall v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 1 Sess. Cas. 1060 (Scot. 1899).
47. Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708 (1931); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.
App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664
(1903) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
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of a stranger who thus occupies the position of parent, the action may
be maintained.4 8 Thus a child may recover from a guardian, step-
parent or other person in loco parentis for failure to afford that protec-
tion which the law requires. The protection required in such a case
includes protection against the dangerous activities of third persons, when
it is reasonably necessary to the child's safety. An interesting Kentucky
case well illustrates the point.49 Here a young girl was taken into a
defendant's home to work for her board and for a small weekly sum
while she attended school. The defendant's son, to the knowledge of the
defendant but without any serious effort on the latter's part to restrain
him, made advances to the girl and frequent excursions to the child's bed-
chamber. The father of the girl brought an action against the defendant
for the child's seduction. The plaintiff's action was designated as one
for breach of contract but the court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action in tort as the defendant had been charged with negligence
in failing to protect the girl under his care. "One who stands to a child
in loco parentis," said the court,"'
"has the same rights and duties during the continuance of that relationship as
the parent and is bound to use the care incumbent upon a parent to shield
such child from evil and injury ... It [the contract] was merely an undertaking
to perform such duties as were incumbent upon them in the absence of a
contract where they had the custody and control of an immature child. The
contract merely recognized the immaturity of Isabel Cashen and the necessity
on the part of those having custody and control of her to exercise the care and
duty incumbent upon a parent to protect her... A person standing temporarily
in loco parentis may not shut his eyes to obvious danger threatening the moral
or physical well-being of the child committed to his custody and plead non-
liability when injury, due to his failure to exercise that degree of care in-
cumbent upon him under the circumstances, results."
Where the custody of a person is by law entrusted to another under
circumstances which deprive that person of the normal means of defend-
ing himself, there is a duty upon the one in charge to exercise rea-
sonable care to afford protection to the other. Thus, the state, where it
is responsible in tort, as well as sheriffs, wardens or other persons in
charge of prisoners, is bound to exercise care to afford the protection
to the prisoner from the dangerous conduct of third persons which the
prisoner by reason of his incarceration is incapable of finding elsewhere. 1
48. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901); Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903).
49. Cashen v. Riney, 239 Ky. 779, 40 S. W. (2d) 339 (1931).
50. Id. at 341-343.
51. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892); Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94-
Fed. 48 (C. C. D. Ind. 1899); Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892); Hixon
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Not only is the sheriff or jailor required to protect his prisoner against
the violence of an infuriated mob when he has reason to believe that
public opinion is incensed against the prisoner to the point where an
attack is likely to be made upon him, 2 but he must exercise reasonable
care to afford him necessary protection against his fellow prisoners.
Several cases have arisen in which a prisoner has been attacked by an-
other inmate of the prison as a result of the "kangaroo" courts which
have been tolerated from time to time in certain penal institutions.
All these cases have placed emphasis upon the fact that the duty of
reasonable protection to the prisoner must necessarily accompany his
imprisonment and the ensuing inability to protect himself. It is clear
that not only are there dangers peculiar to the imprisonment, but the
prisoner is peculiarly helpless to protect himself from these dangers.
Thus, the very fact that a person is imprisoned on a charge of certain
offenses may so incite the passion of the community that he is in grave
danger of mob violence. Again, incarceration with a group of persons
who because of their social maladjustments are well known to have
vicious and dangerous propensities, at once exposes a person to risks
which are serious and obvious. The circumstances of the prisoner's
arrest or confinement ordinarily make him utterly helpless to protect him-
self either by self-defensive means or by flight. The duty in such cases
is, of course, only the duty to exercise reasonable care, and where a
warden or jailor had neither the legal authority nor ability to obtain
additional guards for the protection of his prisoner, he could not be
found guilty of negligence in failing to do so. Even in such instances,
however, he is bound to employ the ability which he has to give rea-
sonable protection to those in his custody.
It has been held that the relationship of master and servant creates
certain obligations on the part of the master to afford protection to the
servant from certain dangers of the employment not included within
the ambit of the risks assumed by the latter. Thus, the master has been
held to be under a duty to administer first aid in an effort to mitigate
the effects of bodily harm sustained by a servant in the course of the
employment.5" So too, the employer is said to be under a duty to
v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 Pac. 927 (1897); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash. 318, 170 Pac.
1023 (1918); Eberhart v. Murphy, 110 Wash. 158, 188 Pac. 17 (1920); and see Ex parte
Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N. E. 560 (1900).
52. Logan v. United States; Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, both supra note 51.
53. IIxon v. Cupp; Kusah v. McCorkle, both supra note 51.
54. Ohio and Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Early, 141 Ind. 73, 40 N. E. 257 (1894); Rasch v.
Elite Laundry Co., 98 Minn. 357, 108 N. W. 447 (1906); Harris v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co.,
50 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), as to which see (1931) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 479. And
see also (1932) 17 CoP.. L. Q. 505.
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afford his servant protection against extremely inclement weather when
the employment exposes the servant to unusual risks." And there are
recent cases which impose upon the employer the duty either to protect
or warn a servant of danger from the conduct of third persons where the
danger arises out of the work. 6 In one such case, the defendant railroad
company was held liable for a failure to exercise reasonable care to advise
a train guard in its employ of a train robbery of which it had been fore-
warned. Caught unaware by the robbers, the guard lost his life. It was
true that the decedent knew the general risks of his work and assumed
such risks in so far as they were an incident of his employment. By fail-
ing to warn him when it had knowledge of a specific peril, however, the
defendant deprived him of the opportunity to which he was entitled in or-
der to protect himself, and was properly held liable. Here again, the an-
alogy of the privilege of the master to defend his servant against acts of
third persons intended to harm the servant is helpful. Though having
no independent privilege to defend others generally, an actor may defend
his servant against an apparent assault without taking the risk that the
servant is not privileged to defend himself. As to risks not known to
the servant and not customary to the employment but arising out of it,
the master seems under a duty to use reasonable care to warn the servant
if he knows of danger or has peculiar knowledge thereof, and this includes
threatened harm from the dangerous conduct of others.
Carrier and Passenger
There is abundant authority to sustain the liability of a carrier whose
servants have failed to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct
of some of its passengers as to prevent either an intentional harm to
other passengers" or conduct which constitutes an unreasonable risk
of harm to them."' As early as 1865, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
discovered that "the carrier is the protector by law of each passenger
55. Shoemaker v. St. Paul & Duluth Rr. Co., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W. 559 (1891).
56. David v. Missouri Pacific Rr. Co., 328 Mo. 437, 41 S. W. (2d) 179 (1931), noted-
in (1932) 30 MIcH. L. Rav. 806; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alis, 3 F. (2d) 882
(C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
57. New Orleans, St. Louis and Chicago Rr. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200 (1876); Brittom
v. Atlanta & Charlotte Ry. Co., 88 N. C. 536 (1883); Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Richardson, 40 Ind. App. 503, 82 N. E. 536 (1907); Cline v. Milwaukee.
Electric Ry. & Light Co., 146 Wis. 134, 131 N. W. 427 (1911); Koch v. Brooklyn Heights-
Rr. Co., 75 App. Div. 282, 78 N. Y. Supp. 99 (2d Dep't 1902); Murphy v. Western &
Atlantic Rr. Co., 23 Fed. 637 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1885); Flint v. Norwich & New York
Transportation Co., 34 Conn. 554 (1868); Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co. v.
Hinds, 53 Pa. 512 (1866).
58. Chicago, Terre Haute & Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 61 Ind. App. 10, 110 N. E.
240 (1916); Nute v. Boston & Maine Rr. Co., 214 Mass. 184, 100 N. E. 1099 (1913).
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against the malice, the brutality or the drunkenness of his fellow travel-
ers.""a9 Other courts soon followed in extending the duty to include not
only protection against attacks and assaults in actual progress, but also
the taking of precautions against harm whenever the carrier has reason-
able ground for believing that violence is imminent. This duty today
requires the carrier to exercise reasonable vigilance and supervision of
passengers whose known character or condition is likely to make them
a danger to fellow passengers. 60
Corresponding to the duty to protect passengers against wrongdoers
and co-extensive with it is the ancillary privilege on the part of the carrier
to use force against the persons creating the disturbance or the risk of
harm.6 This privilege not only justifies the carrier in either ejecting
the offenders or restraining them until they can be turned over to police
authorities when they are actually engaged in violence, but permits the
carrier to control their conduct to prevent harm to other passengers at
some future time.62 In the exercise of such privilege, the carrier must
not, of course, employ excessive force against the offender and must use
reasonable care not to expose other passengers to danger during the
process of expelling the wrongdoer.
In a few states, the carrier is not only bound to exercise reasonable
care to protect its passengers from the conduct of others which threatens
their bodily safety, but to protect them against conduct which is insulting
and discourteous.6" This curious rule requires a carrier to protect its
passengers against conduct which is not even tortious on the part of the
persons indulging therein. The cases have for the most part been those
in which a woman has been exposed to the ribald talk or profanity of the
carrier's servants or her fellow passengers. This is really a direct protec-
tion of the interest in emotional tranquility-a protection which seems
to be afforded only against carriers. It may be that a carrier should be
required to furnish reasonably decent and comfortable, as well as rea-
59. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Hinds, supra note 57.
60. Cline v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., supra note 57; Nute v. Boston &
Maine Rr. Co.; Chicago, Terre Haute & Southeastern Ry. Co. v. Fisher, both supra note 53.
61. Baltimore, Pittsburgh & Chicago Rr. Co. v. McDonald, 68 Ind. 316 (1879);
Edgerly v. Union Street Rr. Co., 67 N. H. 312 (1892); Sorenson v. Lincoln Traction Co.,
94 Neb. 91, 142 N. W. 702 (1913).
62. Vinton v. Middlesex Rr. Co., 93 Mass. 304 (1865); Berry v. Carolina, Clinchfield
& Ohio Ry. Co., 155 N. C. 287, 71 S. E. 322 (1911).
63. Thayer v. Old Colony Street Ry. Co., 214 Mass. 234, 101 N. E. 368 (1913).
64. Lucy v. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co., 64 Minn. 7, 65 N. W. 944 (1896);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Lee, 167 Ala. 268, 52 So. 648 (1910); Haile v. New Orleans Ry. &
Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914); Philips v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 160 S. C.
323, 158 S. E. 274 (1931). Contra: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 104 S. W. 551 (1907).
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sonably safe facilities, but the cases seem not sufficiently numerous to
draw far reaching generalizations, except perhaps when the insults are
made by the carrier's servants themselves.
Use of Land by Business Visitors
The possessor or occupier of land who holds it open to business visitors
is under the affirmative duty to see that the land is reasonably safe for
the reception of such visitors or to use reasonable care to warn them of
any unreasonably dangerous condition. 5 A parallel duty is imposed upon
the occupier of the land to use reasonable care to protect his business
visitors not only from his own dangerous activity but from the conduct
of third persons, whether other business visitors or trespassers. If the
dangerous activity is conducted by the possessor's independent contractor
or concessionaire, the possessor is under the duty of exercising reason-
able care to control or regulate the conduct of the activity to prevent it
from constituting an unreasonable risk to his business guests.66  Thus,
in an early case the management of a public fair was held liable because
a concessionaire conducted a shooting gallery at the fair in an unreason-
ably dangerous manner which resulted in the plaintiff's injury6 The
same duty is imposed upon the occupier to control the conduct of other
business visitors upon his land. And indeed, a recent case has held the
possessor liable when the risk was created by felonious trespassers on
the premises.0 9
The duty in these cases, as in other cases of the duty of a possessor
of land to his business visitors, is an alternative one. It can be discharged
either by using reasonable care to protect the business guests against the
dangerous activity of the wrongdoers or, where such is possible, by giving
them warning adequate to afford the opportunity on their part of assum-
ing the risk of harm or protecting themselves by leaving or remaining
away from the land.70 In the absence of an adequate warning, however,
the possessor of the land may not only be under the duty of using such
ability as he has at the time to protect his business visitors, but if he
65. TORTS REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 213.
66. Id. § 214.
67. Conradt v. Clauve, 93 Ind. 476 (1883).
68. Exton v. Central Rr. Co., 62 N. J. L. 7, 42 Atl. 486 (1898); Mastad v. Swedish
Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913 (1901); Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v. Dawson, 31
Ind. App. 605, 68 N. E. 909 (1903); Blakeley v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N.
W. 482 (1908) ; Moone v. Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649, 65 S. E. 712 (1909).
69. Sinn v. Farmers Deposit Savings Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 Atl. 163 (1930), as to which
see (1931) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 368.




knows of the danger in advance, he must use reasonable care to be pre-
pared to meet it when it becomes imminent. Thus, an Indiana case n'
held that the management of an amusement park was under the duty of
employing sufficient guards to maintain peace and order in the park and
to protect its patrons, and that the fact that it had knowledge that a
group of white men were conspiring to insult and attack negroes fre-
quenting the park required the management either to warn the intended
victims or to employ an additional number of police and guards. In the
case of a common carrier, of course, it is frequently impossible to dis-
charge the duty owed its patrons by a mere warning. This is true if
the only way for a patron to avoid the risk is to forego or relinquish
the service offered. In this respect, a carrier is in a position different
from other business invitors. The duty imposed upon the carrier or other
utility to furnish service to all members of the public prevents it from
shifting the risk of harm from the dangerous activities of third persons
to the patron by a mere warning. In such a case, the duty which the
carrier owes to the public is to furnish it with reasonably safe service
and this includes protection against the misconduct of third persons as
well as protection against risks incident to the defective condition of
the utility's equipment.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that in two general types of
situation a considerable number of cases have imposed an affirmative
duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent danger to others.
In one type of case, the defendant has been in some special relationship
with the person whose conduct he is required to control which gives him
a peculiar ability to affect that person's conduct. In the other type, the
defendant has been in some special relationship with the person threat-
ened or injured which entitles that person to the protection of the de-
fendant. Some of the cases discussed under the one or the other of these
categories fall into rather well recognized groups; others represent un-
usual and rare fact situations. The policy, however, is not difficult to
recognize in all of them. It is a dominant one in the law of torts and
emphasizes again the relational character of tort law. Human beings
by their activities have all sorts of dealings with each other and come
into all sorts of relations. Some of these are tenuous, and to them the
law attaches no special obligations. Others are regarded as of sufficient
importance to require for a sound and stable social order certain assur-
ances of safety to person and property on the part of the parties thereto.
The social policies which determine what relationships require such spe-
cial assurance and what ones are sufficiently unimportant not to require
them are so incredibly complicated as almost to defy analysis. These
71. Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v. Dawson, supra note 68.
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policies in the main reflect the general attitude of the community; they
represent for the most part the popular notions of what constitutes proper
assumptions on the part of one person when dealing with another. The
common law attempts to interpret these communal reactions and to crys-
tallize them into rules of law. As business and social relations become
more and more complicated, these reactions are modified on the one hand
and extended on the other. This requires modification and extension of
the common law. The principles governing the duty of one person to
control the conduct of another have this general elasticity which charac-
terizes other principles of tort law. When, therefore, novel cases involv-
ing the problem arise, it will become the duty of the judges to examine
the analogies of such cases as are discussed here and to determine
whether, in the light of human experience as reflected in the decisions,
the relations of the parties fall into one or the other of the general
divisions mentioned. If, on the whole, it seems that it is not desirable
to add to the number of fact situations falling within these two general
divisions, no affirmative obligation will be imposed. If, on the other hand,
the relationship of the parties appears to be, for all practical social pur-
poses, indistinguishable from the type of cases which have been included
under these general divisions, tort law may add another cubit to the
stature which it has acquired over centuries of constant growth.
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